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The primary means for psychotherapy interaction is language. Since talk-in-interaction is
accomplished and rendered interpretable by the systematic use of linguistic resources,
this study focuses on one of the central issues in psychotherapy, namely agency,
and the ways in which linguistic resources, person references in particular, are used
for constructing different types of agency in psychotherapy interaction. The study
investigates therapists’ responses to turns where the client complains about a third party.
It focuses on the way therapists’ responses distribute experience and agency between
the therapist and the client by comparing responses formulated with the zero-person
(a formulation that lacks a grammatical subject, that is, a reference to the agent) to
responses formulated with a second person singular pronoun that refers to the client. The
study thus approaches agency as situated, dynamic and interactional: an agent is a social
unit whose elements (flexibility and accountability) are distributed in the therapist-client
interaction. The data consist of 70 audio-recorded sessions of cognitive psychotherapy
and psychoanalysis, and themethod of analysis is conversation analysis and interactional
linguistics. The main findings are that therapists use the zero-person for two types of
responses: affiliating and empathetic responses that distribute the emotional experience
between the client and the therapist, and responses that invite clients to interpret their
own experiences, thereby distributing control and responsibility to the clients. In contrast,
the second person references are used for re-constructing the client’s past history. The
conclusion is that therapists use the zero-person for both immediate emotional work and
interpretative co-work on the client’s experiences. The study suggests that therapists’
use of the zero-person does not necessarily attribute “weak agency” to the client but
instead might strengthen the clients’ agency in the sense of control and responsibility in
the long term.
Keywords: agency, person reference, conversation analysis, interactional linguistics, psychotherapy interaction,
Finnish
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INTRODUCTION
One of the prime reasons clients request psychotherapy is their
experience of a loss of agency in life (Wahlström, 2006). Clients
may feel that their ability to attribute thoughts, feelings and
actions to themselves, to control their own actions, and to
influence their own choices is severely restricted (e.g., Avdi,
2005). The various psychotherapeutic traditions use different
methods for seeking to help clients develop their diminished
agency. For instance, in humanistic therapies, introspective
reflections in a supportive environment are thought to empower
clients to become more self-determining, while, in behavioral
therapies, gaining new skills is seen as a means of increasing
clients’ agency by providing more options for acting (Williams
and Levitt, 2007). By contrast, in therapies that draw on
social constructivism, agency is understood to be negotiated
and constructed in clinical interaction (Avdi, 2005). Therapist
responsiveness is understood to facilitate the joint construction
of new interpretations of previous experiences as well as new
meanings attached to previously used words. This is thought to
increase clients’ ability to adopt a reflective position toward their
experiences and that in way diminish non-agentic positioning
(Avdi et al., 2015).This framework thus emphasizes the role of
linguistic practices in the process of displaying and diminishing
clients’ non-agentic positioning of themselves (e.g., Avdi, 2005;
Toivonen, 2019).
According to previous research, one linguistic practice for
non-agentic positioning is the use of “agentless” talk, i.e., the
“avoidance” of personal reference forms (Kurri and Wahlström,
2007). When clients use obscure personal forms, therapists often
use specific person references (Kurri and Wahlström, 2007), in
particular the second person singular pronoun, to invite them to
move from a non-agentive to a more agentive and responsible
position. Nonetheless, it is not only clients who use impersonal
forms when referring to themselves; occasionally, therapists
also use impersonal forms when referring to clients. Kurri
and Wahlström (2007) studied one therapist’s use of agentless
formulations and found that the therapist treated the client’s
agentless formulations as a delicate matter and used agentless
formulations as a step-by-step strategy when working toward
agentic reformulations. They suggested that the therapist’s use
of agentless formulations is a strategy for saving the client’s face
(Kurri and Wahlström, 2007).
In our study, we explore therapists’ use of impersonal forms,
in particular the zero-person construction, when referring to
clients. We compare them to turns in which therapists refer
to the client with a second person singular pronoun. In our
analyses, we draw on interactional linguistic studies on the use
and meaning of Finnish personal forms in everyday informal
interaction (Laitinen, 2006; Visapää, 2008) and interactional
and anthropological studies on agency (Enfield and Kockelman,
2017). The aim is to gain understanding of the ways in which
these two different personal forms (the zero-person and second
person singular) are used in psychotherapy interaction, given that
personal forms allow for the distribution of agency in various
ways (see e.g., Couper-Kuhlen and Etelämäki, 2015).
Recent studies of language and social interaction suggest that
agency is dynamic and social and show that agency can be
distributed in different ways in interaction (see e.g., Enfield,
2013; Enfield and Kockelman, 2017). According to these studies,
agency is rarely the possession of single individuals; rather, over
a course of action, agency can be distributed in such a way that
the individuals involved play more or less complementary roles
in performing the action. Moreover, multiple individuals can be
joined in a single unit of motivation and accountability. Agency
in interaction is, thus, understood as “a fission-fusion affair
involving constant navigation of separateness and boundedness,
affiliation and disaffiliation, an endless tacking back and forth
between inhabiting different social units, with always-relevant
consequences for our social relationships, both fleeting and
enduring” (Enfield, 2013, XVI). In this study, we adopt this view
of agency. Thus, we understand agency in two different ways.
First, we understand agency as flexible, social and distributed
(Enfield, 2017): an agent is a social unit whose elements
(flexibility and accountability) are dynamically distributed in
real-time interaction between the therapist and the client.
Second, agency can refer to clients’ ability to take initiative
and responsibility for their actions in everyday life, which is
a more traditional view of agency in psychotherapy. In this
study, we focus on the dynamic distribution of agency between
the therapist and the client in the therapy session, and extend
the idea of distributed agency to emotion and experience. We
analyze how the client’s earlier emotions and experiences are
constructed in the psychotherapy interaction either as shared
or non-shared by the client and the therapist, that is, either
as epistemically accessible to both of the participants or not.
We analyze the dynamic construction of agency and experience
through the use of personal forms in Finnish psychotherapy
interaction. We use this linguistic phenomenon as a concrete
and observable example of negotiating and constructing agency
in situ. By focusing on the therapist’s responsive turns, we
discuss the ways in which such turns both share and support the
client’s agency. In what follows, we begin by shortly introducing
the Finnish zero-person construction and the previous research
on the topic in the context of psychotherapy and everyday
interaction. This will form the basis for our analysis, presented
in the section Results.
ZERO-PERSON IN PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Due to their different grammatical structures, in particular
person systems, different languages possess different
affordances for distributing agency and experience in
interaction. In the following, we first provide a brief
overview of the Finnish person system with a focus on
the impersonal forms, in particular on the form called
“zero-person.” We then give a brief review of the ways
the zero person has been described in previous research
on psychotherapy. Lastly, we demonstrate how the zero-
person is used for distributing agency and experience in
everyday informal Finnish interaction because this will provide
the basis for our analysis of the use of the zero-person in
psychotherapy interaction.
As in many other languages spoken in Europe, Finnish
features personal pronouns for expressing the first, second
and third person in both the singular (SG) and plural (PL):
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minä (“I”), sinä (“you.SG”), hän (“she/he”), me (“we”), te
(“you.PL”), he (“they.PL”). Finnish is, however, distinct in that
in addition to the first, second and third person singular and
plural form, it features a personal passive and a zero-person.
In Finnish, the personal passive form always implies a human
agent. For example, the passive clause poikaa lyötiin kivellä
(“the boy was hit by a stone”) implies that the boy was struck
by a stone thrown by a human agent or agents. In addition
to the personal passive, however, Finnish possesses a zero-
person construction (marked as Ø in the translation lines of
the transcripts). The zero-person construction has no overt




Ø (one)1 looks at elderly people
(b) kirjattuna pitää pis[tää joo.
registered-ESS Ø must.3SG put-INF PRT
as registered Ø (one) must put it yes.
The difference between the Finnish personal passive and the zero-
person is that whereas the passive refers to a collective agent,
the zero-person refers to an individual but unspecified agent
(Laitinen, 2006). Depending on the context, the zero-person can
refer to either one of the speech act participants (first, second, or
third person), in other words, it can be interpreted as “anyone,”
“I,” or “you.”
In earlier research on Finnish, the zero-person was first
analyzed as a “missing person.” Its use was claimed to be a
negative politeness strategy to avoid explicit personal reference.
Based on conversational data, newer research has, however,
criticized this view and suggested that in affective contexts, the
zero-person offers an indexical site to be identified with, “an
empty place of the common experience, constructed for anyone
to enter” that invites the recipient to view or experience the world
from that place (Laitinen, 2006, 218; see also Laitinen, 1995).
Moreover, in the context of directives, it has been suggested
that it is employed as an offer to distribute agency between
the participants more evenly than in requests with explicit
personal forms (Couper-Kuhlen and Etelämäki, 2015). Research
on Finnish psychotherapy interaction has largely adopted the
former view.
Prior research on psychotherapy has suggested that the
grammar of verbs plays a key role in mediating linguistic
constructions of personal agency (Todd 214). It has been
argued that clients who feel they are in an object position
with respect to the difficulties they are facing use stative verbs
(such as have a problem, is depressed) to display their problems
(Todd, 2014). Previous research on Finnish psychotherapy has
suggested that the agent of a particular action is typically left
unspecified by using, for instance, zero-person verb forms (Kurri
and Wahlström, 2007; see also Toivonen, 2019). According
to these studies, clients use the zero-person form in at least
two types of interactional contexts. First, clients employ it to
1In order to make the translation more accessible to non-Finnish readers, we use
the English “one” in parentheses in the translation line. Note, however, that that the
Finnish person system is different from the English one, and that the zero-person
form does not function similarly to “one” in English.
diminish their personal responsibility (Kurri and Wahlström,
2007). By using the zero-person, clients can present themselves
as victims, as people who lack control over the actions they are
describing. The zero-person form is also typically used when
clients describe themselves as objects or stooges of someone else’s
actions (Toivonen et al., 2019). In this case, the other actor can be
anything that is referred to as initiating the action or creating the
client’s circumstances, such as a diagnosis, divorce or childhood
events (Toivonen et al., 2019).
These types of expressions are noted to provide clients with
a strategy to save face as a moral person when describing, for
instance, their alcohol use, drunk driving or other presumably
morally questionable behavior (Kurri and Wahlström, 2007;
Halonen, 2008). Prior research has shown how therapists point
out, challenge and reformulate such expressions (e.g., Kurri
and Wahlström, 2007; Partanen et al., 2010), as it is their
therapeutic task to place the client in an agentic position in
his or her life (Kurri and Wahlström, 2007). Second, the zero-
person form enables clients to discuss their own experiences
in a way that constructs the experiences as commonly sharable
(Halonen, 2008). By leaving the reference open, clients can
invite others to identify with their description. Therapists, in
turn, have been found to use the zero-person construction
to show that the client’s description is typical or general,
for instance, for all addicts in group counseling (Halonen,
2008). The zero-person can also function as a face-saving
strategy by not defining whose experience is in question:
it enables discussion on difficult issues without pointing a
finger at the client (Kurri and Wahlström, 2007; Halonen,
2008).
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, interactional
linguistic research on the Finnish zero-person has largely
rejected the view that the zero-person is used as a face-saving
or negative politeness strategy because these theories are not
directly compatible with an interactional view on language and
interaction (see also Schegloff, 1988). Instead, it has suggested
that zero person forms are typically found in two types of
contexts: in affective accounts, and directives. In affective
accounts, it invites the recipient to share the experience and the
stance with the teller (e.g., Laitinen, 1995, 2006; Visapää, 2008) as
in Example (1):
In affective contexts, it is thus suggested that the zero-person
form is used for inviting the recipient to share an emotional
stance toward the experience (Laitinen, 2006; Visapää, 2008).
In other words, it can be used for distributing the experience.
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In the context of directives, on the other hand, the zero can
be used for negotiating the agency of the future action with
respect to responsibility and accountability for the action. It offers
to distribute agency more evenly between the participants than
the 1st and 2nd person forms (Couper-Kuhlen and Etelämäki,
2015; see also Rossi and Zinken, 2016 on similar phenomena in
Italian and Polish). This is exemplified in the following Example
(2). The example comes from a telephone call where the reason
for the call is that Satu (who lives in Northern Finland) has
forgotten her wallet in Vesa’s (who lives in Southern Finland)
car during Vesa’s visit to Northern Finland. Satu now calls
Vesa in order to ask him to send her the wallet by mail as a
registered letter.
Satu’s request (lines 1–3) is formulated as a declarative statement
including a modal verb uskaltaa (“venture”) with a zero-person
construction. Correspondingly, Vesa’s response is formulated
as a declarative statement that includes the modal verb pitää
(“must”) with a zero-person construction. The modal verb pitää
(“must”) in Vesa’s turn expresses stronger necessity that the one
in Satu’s turn, and by that means Vesa displays independence
in evaluating how the wallet will be best sent. Although it is
clear that Vesa will perform the future action, both participants
thus participate in deciding upon that action. In turns involving
directions that are formulated with a zero-person construction,
the zero-person occurs typically together with modal verbs that
express the necessity/desirability of the proposed action (e.g.,
“can,” “need,” “must”). These turns are, moreover, declaratively
formulated; i.e., they are formulated as statements that invite
the recipient first to evaluate the rationale behind the action
as well as the manner of the performance of that action. By
offering the recipient of a directive a place to co-evaluate
the necessity/desirability and manner of performance of an
action, the combination of the zero-person and a modal verb
distributes agency—accountability and responsibility over the
action—between the participants more symmetrically than first
or second person forms.
In the following, we explore psychotherapists’ use of person
reference forms. More specifically, we investigate how the use of
the zero-person and second person singular pronoun distributes
the client’s experience and agency in the therapist’s talk and how
the choice of personal form corresponds to the action that the
turn is accomplishing.
DATA AND METHODS
The data consist of 70 audio-recordings of actual psychotherapy
encounters in Finland, collected in 1999–2009 in two different
private sector clinics. The data come from four different
dyads: two therapists with four different clients. One therapist
is an experienced psychoanalyst, representing an object-
relations-oriented psychoanalytic school. The other therapist is
an experienced cognitive therapist, representing a cognitive-
constructivist strand of cognitive therapy. The lengths of the
encounters vary from 45 to 60min and comprise ∼30 h
of interaction from both therapy approaches. The data are
transcribed according to the transcription conventions developed
by Jefferson (2004). Both clients in cognitive therapy were women
in their twenties suffering from depression. One suffered also
from panic attacks, while the other had been diagnosed with
a personality disorder. In psychoanalysis, one of the clients
was a man in his forties suffering from depression and work-
related burn-out. The other client was a woman in her sixties
experiencing a difficult situation in her life (her husband was
terminally ill). In cognitive therapy, regular planned meetings
were held approximately once a week. In psychoanalysis, the
frequency of the sessions was approximately three times a week.
Informed consent was obtained from all the participants for
the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data
included in this article. The therapists informed the clients of
the research, both verbally and in writing. They were also given
the possibility to withdraw their consent at any point of the data
collection. The researchers were not present in any of the therapy
encounters. The anonymity of the therapists and clients has been
carefully ensured: all names and other details which might enable
identification of the participants have been altered in the text and
data excerpts.
The data were analyzed by means of conversation analysis and
interactional linguistics. Conversation analysis is a systematic
method for studying human social interaction. According to
conversation analysis, social actions are accomplished through
adjacent utterances (Schegloff, 2007; Stivers and Sidnell, 2012;
Clift, 2016). This means that a prior utterance constrains
the following turn, which shows what social action the prior
utterance was understood to be; for instance, questions elicit
answers, formulations elicit confirmation or rejection, and the
sharing of an emotional experience elicits affiliation. Interactional
linguistics is the conversation analytically informed study of
linguistic structure and meaning, the starting point of which
lies in understanding language as a thoroughly interactional
phenomenon (Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 2018).
The centrality of sequences of adjacent actions and linguistic
structures has some important implications for conversation
analytic studies of psychotherapeutic interaction. Thus,
phenomena that are specifically relevant for psychotherapy,
such as the therapist-client relationship and the expression
of emotions in interaction, are examined in the context of
sequences of actions, for example clients’ descriptions of their
experience and therapists’ formulation of that experience
(Peräkylä et al., 2008; Peräkylä, 2012). Conversation analysis
and interactional linguistics assume that interpersonal relations,
emotions and the like exist in and through sequences of actions.
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Consequently, the aim of conversation analytic studies in
psychotherapy is to describe not only these actions but also the
way psychotherapeutic processes occur through sequences of
such actions (Peräkylä, 2019). In this study, we focus on one
aspect of that therapeutic process, the distribution of the client’s
experience and agency and describe how it is accomplished
through the therapist’s choice of the personal form. Rather than
analyzing this linguistic form (person reference) as such, we use
the results of previous interactional linguistic studies to analyze
how agency is distributed in psychotherapy interaction.
Our analysis began by first collecting every sequence of
actions in which the client complained about a third party, for
instance, their mother or spouse. We decided to restrict our
analysis in this context because previous studies have shown
that complaining about a third party is a problematic activity
in everyday interactions (see Heinemann and Traverso, 2009),
and both the zero-person form and the second person form
were found to be used in this context (see Voutilainen et al.,
2010a). In these complaints, clients present themselves as having
been inappropriately treated by the third party in question and
describe the negative experiences they have encountered with
that person (Voutilainen et al., 2010a). From 60 h of interaction,
74 such third-party complaints were identified. Next, we analyzed
the therapists’ responses to the clients’ third-party complaints
and investigated the ways in which these responses addressed
the clients’ accounts. At this point, we paid specific attention
to the person reference forms that the therapists used in their
responses. On the therapists’ responses to the 74 third-party
complaints in our data, 51 were formulated with a zero-person,
and 23 with a second person singular pronoun. The cases were
divided into three categories based on the immediate sequential
context and the personal reference form (zero-person or second
person singular) used in the therapist’s turn. These categories
were (1) a zero-person form when displaying empathy (32 cases),
(2) a zero-person formwhen inviting an interpretation (19 cases),
and (3) the second person form in the context of tracing the
problematic elements of the client’s life history (23 cases). In the
Results section below, we present these categories through four
data examples.
RESULTS
In the therapists’ responses, we found that the zero-person form
occurred in two contexts: in displays of empathy toward the
client’s emotions and in interpretations of the client’s experiences
and circumstances. In turn, the second-person singular pronoun
was used when the therapist was re-constructing the client’s
history. In the following, we first discuss the use of the zero-
person and then compare these uses to cases where the therapist
uses the second person singular pronoun.
Empathetic Use of the Zero-Person:
Treating the Experience as Actual Here and
Now
We found that the zero-person form treats the client’s experience
as actual and epistemically available in the here-and-now of
the therapeutic situation or in the client’s current life more
generally. As has been demonstrated in everyday talk (Laitinen,
1995, 2006), the use of the zero-person presents an experience
as shareable and thus epistemically available to the recipient.
In therapeutic interaction, the therapist can project a sense of
speaking “from within” the experience when using the zero-
person (Vehviläinen, 2003; Voutilainen et al., 2010b;Weiste et al.,
2016). In other words, the zero-person is used for displaying
empathy: for displaying recognition and understanding
of the client’s emotional experience as expressed by
the client.
Extract (3) below is drawn from a cognitive psychotherapy
session. It represents an example of the use of the zero-
person in a turn functioning as an empathetic response.
The client discusses her persistent fear of being physically
assaulted when out in the city (lines 5–11). This fear is
particularly intense during the night, even when the client is
with her boyfriend, Ville (lines 16–20, 23). The client’s talk
is hesitant and perturbed: it includes several pauses, and self-
initiated same-turn repairs of different types (see Schegloff,
2011).
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In her account in lines 5–24, the client uses the zero-person
form (lines 7–8, 10, 13–15) to display her experience as shareable
(Laitinen, 1995, 2006). In line 24, the therapist takes the turn
and produces a formulation that highlights the key descriptive
element of the client’s account (from lines 16–20, 23) (Weiste
and Peräkylä, 2013): the client is afraid, even when accompanied
by her boyfriend. The therapist’s turn begins with the particle et
(“that”), which marks it as a paraphrase of the client’s previous
turn. The emotion (feeling unsafe, literally translated “is unsafe”)
is picked up from the client’s previous turn. Like the client in her
account (lines 7–8, 10, 13–15), the therapist uses the zero-person
form of the verb in the formulation (“Ø is”). It is noteworthy
that whereas in lines 16–18 the client begins to formulate
the utterance as a negative statement but self-interrupts and
reformulates it as a positive one, the therapist’s formulation is
constructed as a positive statement. Moreover, whereas at the
end of her account (lines 16–17) the client uses the first-person
form emmä välttämättä Villenkää kanssa (“I don’t necessarily
[feel safe] with Ville either”), the therapist uses the zero-person
in her formulation. The therapist’s formulation with the zero-
form does not, thus, merely echo the agency and experience in
the client’s account. Instead, the therapist reformulates the client’s
account based on the self-repair in the client’s utterance, and the
zero-person offers the client a place as an experiencer of this
re-formulated account (see Laitinen, 2006).
On completion of her formulation (line 24), the therapist
produces the particle mm which conveys acknowledgment and
confirmation, and by producing it at this point, the therapist
positions herself as the recipient of her own formulation. Thus,
she orients to her formulation as if it were the client’s words
that she receives. By using the zero-person form, the therapist
can be heard to speak “from within” the client’s experience
(Vehviläinen, 2003, Voutilainen et al., 2010b, Weiste et al.,
2016), thereby distributing the agency of the experiencing subject
between the therapist and the client. The use of the zero person
creates a place for an experience that is shared, not through
lived life but through empathetic imagination. The therapist
therefore treats the experience as available and understandable
as such, and, in that way, she avoids implying that the client
needs to provide a further account of the experience. The client
confirms the therapist’s formulation (nii, “yeah,” line 25), and
nevertheless elaborates on the feeling (lines 27–29) by using the
zero-person herself, thus continuing to treat the experience as
mutually shared.
In this example, both the client and the therapist use the
zero-person to co-describe the client’s experience, which has
been made mutually available during the therapy session. The
therapist’s use of the zero-person displays empathetic stance to
the client’s account (see also Voutilainen et al., 2010b, Weiste
et al., 2016). By treating the client’s experience as epistemically
available, the therapist makes shared experience possible. In other
words, through empathetically formulating the client’s words, the
therapist, as it were, participates in the client’s experience.
Interpretive Use of the Zero-Person:
Analytical Distancing From the Experience
Another context where therapists use the zero-person is when
interpreting the client’s experience. Example (4) shows a case
in point from a psychoanalytical therapy session. Prior to the
example, the client has been discussing the time in her childhood
when she lived with her mother. She describes herself as an
obedient girl who always attempted to comply with her mother’s
wishes. Moreover, she constantly felt that she was “necessary,
yet not very important” to her mother. Prior to the extract,
the client has hesitantly suggested that her mother was quite
unreliable for a child, and the therapist has pointed out that it
is difficult for the client to say anything bad about her mother.
At the beginning of the extract (lines 1–15, 18–20), the client
elaborates further on her experience of her mother’s unreliability.
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In her account, the client uses the first-person form when
describing her experience (lines 5–7, 11, 19). Unlike the previous
extract where the client used the zero-person form, here the
client does not invite an empathetic recognition of her experience
as strongly; rather, by reflecting on her childhood experience,
she offers a place for an interpretation by the therapist. In his
response (lines 23–25, 27), the therapist offers an interpretation
of the client’s experience that differs in content and perspective
from that offered by the client herself. The therapist’s turn
begins with the particle et (“that”) (line 23), which marks
that the turn is based on the contents of the client’s previous
turn. This is followed by a zero person construction with
a modal verb vois kääntää. . . ja ajatella (“Ø [one] could
turn. . . and think”) (lines 23–24). Thus, the design of the
turn does not specify whether the person who could turn the
thought around is the therapist or the client. The zero-person
offers the client a slot where she can examine her thoughts
from the therapist’s perspective. In other words, while the
therapist is the one who delivers the interpretation, through
the zero-person he offers the place of the analyzer/examiner
of the past situation to the client and so distributes the
agency in interpreting the experience between himself and
the client.
The interpretation changes the perspective and suggests that
the motivation for the client’s childhood behavior came from
the client’s mother instead of the client. The client initiates a
partial confirmation with a concessive phrase, niin voishan sen
niinkin (“yes Ø [one] could also think it so”), also using the zero
form (line 29), and so takes the interpretive position offered by
the therapist. The therapist intervenes in this (line 30) with a
turn that is marked as a continuation of his previous turn by
the particle ja (“and”). This turn presents the client with the
consequences of her mother’s behavior: it offers the experience
[“no time to think about (one’s)self nor to live Ø (one’s) own
life”] to the client to identify with. The client then produces
an apparent confirmation (line 33). It begins with an agreeing
particle, nii (“yes”), followed by an et (“so that”) initiating
elaborating talk where the focus is on her mother. Nonetheless,
the content of the talk is in slight contradiction to the therapist’s
suggestion in lines 23–25. However, the client maintains a
reflective position on her experience and so aligns with the
therapist’s interpretative project that he suggested through the
zero-person form.
The two examples above illustrated the two contexts in
which the therapists in our data use the zero-person in
their responses to the client’s third-party complaints. In
the empathetic response, the zero-person treated the client’s
experience as recognizable to the therapist. In the interpretative
response, the therapist presented his own interpretation of
the client’s experience, and, by using the zero-form, invited
the client to share the interpretative position. In contrast
to these two uses of the zero-form, we will next discuss
cases where the therapist refers to the client with the second
person form.
Creating Asymmetric Agency: Second
Person Reference
Whereas, the zero-person in therapists’ formulations invites
patients to deal with their experience, either emotionally
or by taking an analytic stance toward it, we found that
second person references are used for re-constructing the
client’s past history. We argue that in these cases, the use
of the second person singular pronoun treats the client’s
experience (in relation to third parties) as not shared by
the client and the therapist, thus displaying asymmetric
epistemic access to the experience (cf. the zero-form). Instead
of providing an empathetic response to or an interpretation
of the client’s previous account, turns that include a second
person singular pronoun make relevant a further explication of
the experience.
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Example (5) provides a case in point. The example is from
cognitive therapy, where the client has discussed a recent meeting
with her father (referred to as Matti) in which her father
had described her mother’s behavior as outrageous when she
had been a child. At the beginning of the extract, the client
moves to discuss the conflict of loyalty she feels between her
divorced parents.
In her account, the client uses the first-person form “I” (lines
2, 4, 6–7). As the client does not use the zero-person form,
she does not invite as strong an empathetic recognition of
her experience as in Example 3. Instead, by reflecting on
her childhood experience, the client offers a place for an
interpretation by the therapist. The therapist responds to the
client’s account by highlighting the other side of her conflict
of loyalty, that is, her mother and her unpredictable behavior
(lines 11–13). The turn begins with a contrastive conjunctionmut
(“but”) followed by the adverb toisaalta (“on the other hand”),
followed by a declaratively formulated B-event statement that
concerns the client’s perception sä tunnistat myös (“you also
recognize”). B-event statements, namely declaratively formulated
utterances that fall into the recipient’s knowledge domain,
function as polar questions by making a confirmation or
disconfirmation the relevant next turn (Labov and Fanshel,
1977). The beginning of the therapist’s turn (“but on the other
hand”) maintains the relevance of the client’s experience—as
recounted by the client—but the rest of the turn suggests that
there is another side to the client’s story. The therapist’s assertion
is thus empathetic toward the client’s description, but it also
confronts the client’s talk by bringing in elements that have
not been mentioned explicitly, namely, the client’s negative
attitude toward her mother. By formulating her turn as a B-
event statement with a second person singular pronoun, referring
directly to the client as “you,” the therapist indicates more of
an epistemic asymmetry between the participants than in the
previous examples, where the zero-person form suggested a
shared affective or interpretative stance. Furthermore, compared
to the zero-person form, which implies shared agency, the use
of “you” also evokes “I,” and thus two separate agents in the
on-going situation.
In comparison to the uses of the zero-person in the context of
empathy, here the client’s experience is construed as belonging to
the client’s domain of knowledge, as something that the therapist
can infer but to which she lacks equal epistemic access. This
invites the client to relate herself to the therapist’s suggestions
and consider the ways in which she can, or cannot, agree with
them. The client’s response (line 14) begins with a conjunction
chain joo kyllä mut (“yeah yes but”), whose basic function is
to claim that the other speaker has incorrect or insufficient
knowledge (Niemi, 2014). In this way, the client also implies
epistemic asymmetry between the participants. This is followed
by talk that returns to the present: the client’s mother no longer
suffers from outbursts of rage. The client uses the characterization
“temperamental” (already used by the therapist in line 12),
which is quite different from, and in a way more complimentary
than, the characterization “getting sudden and frightening fits
of rage.”
In sum, unlike the empathetic responses with the zero-
person, here the experience in question (a negative stance
toward the client’s mother) is not displayed as being equally
accessible to the participants; rather, the therapist seeks to
help the client identify all the aspects of the past experience
that need to be dealt with in the therapy session. As we
claimed in the analysis of the previous extracts, shared agency
and shared epistemic stance are bounded in the use of
the zero-person form. For shared agency, the participants
require shared knowledge. When using the second person
form, the therapist implies that there is insufficient shared
knowledge for shared agency to be attributed when describing
the experience.
The next extract (6) further elaborates on the therapist’s
use of second person references. It comes from the same
therapy session as Example (4) and it is a direct continuation
of it.
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In response to the client’s elaboration after the interpretation in
Example (4), the therapist sums up the meaning of the client’s
mother not telling the client that she should take care of things:
the client had to figure it out for herself (line 39). The turn begins
with the conjunctive adverb vaan (“instead”), which makes the
turn a direct syntactic continuation of the client’s previous turn.
Consequently, the turn aligns grammatically with the client’s
previous turn, but it shifts the focus from the mother to the
client. Moreover, the turn includes the modal verb piti (“had to”),
expressing necessity. The modal verb construes the past situation
as a burden to the client and already implies that this necessity
perhaps came from the client’s mother (which the therapist in
his later turn in line 45 explicitly suggests). Again, through the
second person reference, an asymmetry between “you” and “I”
is established; the therapist (first in lines 49–55 and then in line
60) infers aspects of the clients past experience that have not
been made available in the previous talk but have to be traced.
Here, the therapist does not invite the client to co-interpret the
experience but instead suggests, and later in line 60 insists on, an
interpretation, regardless of the client’s resistance (first in lines
42–43 and later in lines 57–59).
The client’s response begins with the particle nii no (“yeah
well”), which implies disagreement. It is followed by talk that
transforms the therapist’s suggestion that the client’s mother “on
purpose,” (tahallaan, line 54) caused the client’s over-developed
sense of responsibility into a view that is more favorable toward
the client’s mother: she did it “unconsciously” (tiedostamatta). As
we can see from the continuation (lines 59, 60), this is followed by
a sequence where the client and the therapist disagree on the real
state of affairs in the past. Unlike the extracts where the therapist
used the zero-person form, the therapist does not suggest
that the client’s experience is available in the here-and-now of
the therapeutic interaction; rather, there is a gap between the
therapist’s and the client’s knowledge. However, in her response
in line 57, the client uses the zero-person form and so suggests a
more shared agency and amore symmetric epistemic relationship
between the participants when interpreting the experience in
psychotherapeutic terms.
To sum up, the second person reference was used in situations
where the client’s experience and emotion were not dealt with
as mutually accessible and shared but as an experience that
must be traced from the client’s life history. The therapists’ turn
with the second person reference re-constructed the client’s life
history from the therapist’s perspective, offering a version that
differed from the client’s account for the client to evaluate. By
doing this, they challenged the client’s previous understanding.
The asymmetry that the person reference builds between “you”
and “I” (in contrast to a shared understanding of emotion
or interpretive agency in the uses of the zero-person) can
be seen to reflect this epistemic difference and distance from
the experience.
Summary of the Results
In the four examples above (3–6), we discussed the use of
personal forms in three types of therapist responses: a zero-
person form displaying empathy, a zero-person form inviting
interpretation, and a second person form in the context of
tracing the problematic elements of the client’s life history.
We proposed that these forms perform distinct functions in
therapeutic interaction. The use of the zero-person in general
creates symmetry between the participants. When used in the
context of empathy, it displays access to and understanding of the
experience described by the client. Thus, it creates a symmetric
relationship toward the emotive experience and functions as an
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empathetic response. Moreover, it invites the client to retake
the “position of the zero”—the experiencing subject—and to
notice and live through the emotive experience together with
the therapist. When used in the context of interpretation, in
turn, the zero person invites the client to adopt the position
of an observing subject together with the therapist. In this use,
it aims to create distance between the experienced emotion
and the client and invites the client to take an interpretive
perspective on the experience together with the therapist. The use
of the second person form “you” always invokes the speaking “I”
(Benveniste, 1966 [1956]) and thus foregrounds the separateness
of the knowledge and agency of the participants. In our cases,
the therapist uses the second person form in turns where s/he
names an emotion or experience that has been implied but not
previously named in the client’s talk. The use of this form thus
explains the client’s experiences from the therapist’s perspective
and aims to identify the experience to be dealt with in therapy.
DISCUSSION
As Enfield (2013) observes, social agency is a dynamic,
interactional phenomenon. Our analysis demonstrates that this
perspective is also applicable to and informative for the study
of psychotherapeutic process. The strength of the conversation
analytic and interactional linguistic approaches adopted in this
research lies in their efforts to study agency as a two-way
relationship distributed over the course of actions performed by
the therapist and client during therapeutic sessions. Thus, the
analysis centers neither solely on the inner processes occurring
within the client nor on the interventions performed by the
therapist. Instead, the focus of analysis is the joint negotiation of
agency and the consequent transformation of the description of
the client’s experience (see also Peräkylä, 2019).
Our analysis indicates that, when several options exist for
person reference in a language, psychotherapists’ choice of a
particular alternative gains its specificmeaning in its interactional
context. In the case of third person complaints, the use of
the zero-person form, which has previously been described as
a “vague” person reference (Kurri and Wahlström, 2007), did
not merely imply weak agency for the client (or the therapist);
rather, it indexed the sharedness of the experience and agency
in the contexts of empathy and interpretation. In comparison to
the zero-person form, the choice of the second person singular
pronoun placed the client more clearly ‘on stage’ as the target of
the talk. This separateness, too, performs therapeutic functions.
In the context of responses to third party complaints, the
separateness of the agents (therapist and client) served to trace
or identify the experience to be dealt with, in order to make the
experience mutually available here and now. By contrast, in the
situations where the therapist used the zero-person form, the
person reference did not objectify the client as an agent under
someone else’s surveillance; instead, it implied the boundedness
of the agents. In other words, the experience was not scrutinized
from outside but within the slot opened up by the zero-person.
Our study also indicates that in Finnish psychotherapy
sessions, the use of the zero-person distributes accountability
and responsibility for the emotive experience between the
therapist and the client. In that way, it invites the client
to relate with the emotive experience in the here-and-now
of the therapy session. Moreover, the use of the zero-
person in interpretative actions to distribute accountability and
responsibility for an action invites the client to construct an
interpretative position toward the past experience in question.
This, in turn, may help clients first to re-interpret the distribution
of agency (accountability and responsibility) of their experiences
and to adopt an interpretative perspective in the future: to
analyze the distribution of accountability and responsibility
in their lives and adopt an agentive position with respect to
their decisions.
Our study specifies earlier research on agentless talk (Kurri
and Wahlström, 2007). In contrast to that research, our study
demonstrated that “vague” person references by therapists in the
context of empathy and interpretation do not simply attempt to
save the client’s face; rather, they distribute agency between the
client and the therapist. By using a zero-person form in these
contexts, the therapists offered their clients a position to identify
with, a position of empathetic understanding and interpretation
of their experience (e.g., Eagle and Wolitzky, 1997; Greenberg
and Elliott, 1997).
Our data comes from Finnish psychotherapy interactions
which does not mean that the distribution of agency would
be a uniquely Finnish phenomenon (see, e.g., Enfield and
Kockelman, 2017, Rossi and Zinken, 2016). This raises interesting
questions on how the distribution of agency is accomplished
in other languages since person systems in languages organize
person in different ways (Siewierska, 2004, Malchukov and
Siewierska, 2011). The study of distribution of agency in
therapeutic interaction opens thus an avenue to comparative
studies on how cultural and language differences manifest in
psychotherapeutic work.
In this study, the focus of analysis was the detailed ways
in which personal forms are used in real time therapeutic
interaction and therapists’ use of these linguistic means for subtly
distributing agency between themselves and the client. In this
respect, we found no differences between the two therapeutic
approaches (cognitive therapy and psychoanalysis). It should
be born in mind, however, that our dataset contained just
one therapist from each approach, and thus the question of
differences between therapeutic approaches in the distribution of
agency remains for further research.
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